125 search results - page 7 / 25 » Mechanism Design with Partial Revelation |
AMEC
2004
Springer
15 years 3 months ago
2004
Springer
Abstract. In many settings, bidding agents for auctions do not know their preferences a priori. Instead, they must actively determine them through deliberation (e.g., information p...
CORR
2010
Springer
14 years 9 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider the problem of designing truthful auctions, when the bidders' valuations have a public and a private component. In particular, we consider combinatorial auctions w...
CORR
2008
Springer
14 years 9 months ago
2008
Springer
A common objective in mechanism design is to choose the outcome (for example, allocation of resources) that maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations, without introducing in...
ICESS
2007
Springer
15 years 3 months ago
2007
Springer
Embedded software requires concurrency formalisms other than threads and mutexes used in traditional programming languages like C. Actor-oriented design presents a high level abstr...
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ASPDAC
2008
ACM
14 years 11 months ago
2008
ACM
In nanometer regime, IC designs have to consider the impact of process variations, which is often indicated by manufacturing/parametric yield. This paper investigates a yield model...