513 search results - page 30 / 103 » Mechanism design and deliberative agents |
121
click to vote
ATAL
2010
Springer
15 years 3 months ago
2010
Springer
We investigate the problem of allocating items (private goods) among competing agents in a setting that is both prior-free and paymentfree. Specifically, we focus on allocating mu...
ATAL
2008
Springer
15 years 3 months ago
2008
Springer
This research explores productive multi-player games as a platform for human-computer agent collaboration. A multiagent perspective is taken to examine the principles of both game...
110
click to vote
WINE
2009
Springer
15 years 8 months ago
2009
Springer
A potential downside of prediction markets is that they may incentivize agents to take undesirable actions in the real world. For example, a prediction market for whether a terrori...
106
click to vote
ISAAC
2007
Springer
15 years 8 months ago
2007
Springer
Most of the recent works on algorithmic mechanism design exploit the solution concept of dominant strategy equilibria. Such work designs a proper payment scheme so that selfish ag...
125
click to vote
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
15 years 1 months ago
2008
ACM
For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mech...