We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite g...
Abstract. In social mechanism design, obligation distribution creates individual or contractual obligations that imply a collective obligation. A distinguishing feature from group ...
Abstract. In this paper, we consider the issue of designing agents that successfully balance the amount of time spent in reconsidering their intentions against the amount of time s...
Advances in agent technologies have fueled interest towards combining agent-based techniques with tools from data mining. Furthermore, the advent of the ubiquitous computing paradi...
Petteri Nurmi, Michael Przybilski, Greger Lind&eac...
Multi-agent systems have proven to be a powerful technology for building complex distributed applications. However, the process of designing, configuring and deploying agent-based...
Csongor Nyulas, Martin J. O'Connor, Samson W. Tu, ...