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» Mechanism design and deliberative agents
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ATAL
2007
Springer
15 years 5 months ago
On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values
In a dynamic market, being able to update one’s value based on information available to other bidders currently in the market can be critical to having profitable transactions. ...
Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes
CCGRID
2005
IEEE
15 years 5 months ago
Instant attack stopper in InfiniBand architecture
With the growing popularity of cluster architectures in datacenters and the sophistication of computer attacks, the design of highly secure clusters has recently emerged as a crit...
Manhee Lee, Mazin S. Yousif
AMEC
2003
Springer
15 years 5 months ago
Choosing Samples to Compute Heuristic-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Auctions define games of incomplete information for which it is often too hard to compute the exact Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Instead, the infinite strategy space is often popu...
William E. Walsh, David C. Parkes, Rajarshi Das
SIGMOD
2012
ACM
220views Database» more  SIGMOD 2012»
13 years 2 months ago
GUPT: privacy preserving data analysis made easy
It is often highly valuable for organizations to have their data analyzed by external agents. However, any program that computes on potentially sensitive data risks leaking inform...
Prashanth Mohan, Abhradeep Thakurta, Elaine Shi, D...
ATAL
2003
Springer
15 years 5 months ago
MONAD: a flexible architecture for multi-agent control
Research in multi-agent systems has led to the development of many multi-agent control architectures. However, we believe that there is currently no known optimal structure for mu...
Thuc Vu, Jared Go, Gal A. Kaminka, Manuela M. Velo...