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SIGECOM
2004
ACM
112views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2004»
15 years 7 months ago
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
116
Voted
ATAL
2006
Springer
15 years 5 months ago
Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
WWW
2009
ACM
16 years 2 months ago
General auction mechanism for search advertising
In sponsored search, a number of advertising slots is available on a search results page, and have to be allocated among a set of advertisers competing to display an ad on the pag...
Dávid Pál, Gagan Aggarwal, Martin P&...
ATAL
2006
Springer
15 years 5 months ago
False-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol: Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation
This paper develops a new combinatorial auction protocol called the Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation (GM-SMA). This protocol satisfies the following characteristics:...
Makoto Yokoo, Toshihiro Matsutani, Atsushi Iwasaki
TASE
2008
IEEE
15 years 1 months ago
Mechanism Design for Single Leader Stackelberg Problems and Application to Procurement Auction Design
In this paper, we focus on mechanism design for single leader Stackelberg problems, which are a special case of hierarchical decision making problems in which a distinguished agent...
Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari