In addition to useful Economic interpretation, auction based algorithms are generally found to be efficient. In this note, we observe that the auction-based mechanism can also be u...
We use techniques from sample-complexity in machine learning to reduce problems of incentive-compatible mechanism design to standard algorithmic questions, for a wide variety of r...
Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Jason D. Hartlin...
In recent years auctions have become more and more important in the field of multiagent systems as useful mechanisms for resource allocation and task assignment. In many cases the...
In this paper, we consider competition between sellers offering similar items in concurrent online auctions, where each seller must set its individual auction parameters (such as ...
Enrico H. Gerding, Alex Rogers, Rajdeep K. Dash, N...
We introduce the following consensus estimate problem. Several processors hold private and possibly different lower bounds on a value. The processors do not communicate with each ...