Sequential and simultaneous auctions are two important mechanisms for buying/selling multiple objects. These two mechanisms yield different outcomes (i.e., different revenues and a...
In this paper we present a multi-criteria model for electronic auctions, which is based on reference points. According to the model, the buyer must specify an aspiration point tha...
Abstract. Most recent papers addressing the algorithmic problem of allocating advertisement space for keywords in sponsored search auctions assume that pricing is done via a first...
Yossi Azar, Benjamin E. Birnbaum, Anna R. Karlin, ...
Restricting the preferences of the agents by assuming that their utility functions linearly depend on a payment allows for the positive results of the Vickrey auction and the Vick...
Paul Harrenstein, Mathijs de Weerdt, Vincent Conit...
This paper presents a secure Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) scheme that does not require third-party servers, i.e., the scheme is executed only by an auctioneer and bidders. Com...