We propose an expressive auction design that allows advertisers to specify the kinds of demographics and websites they wish to target within an advertising network. The design all...
Auctions are useful mechanism for allocating items (goods, tasks, resources, etc.) in multiagent systems. The bulk of auction theory assumes that the bidders’ valuations for ite...
Digital archives protect important data collections from failures by making multiple copies at other archives, so that there are always several good copies of a collection. In a c...
Roberts’ theorem from 1979 states that the only incentive compatible mechanisms over a full domain and range of at least 3 are weighted variants of the VCG mechanism termed affin...
We examine a formal model of sponsored search in which advertisers can bid not only on search terms, but on search terms under specific contexts. A context is any auxiliary infor...
Eyal Even-Dar, Michael J. Kearns, Jennifer Wortman