We study a representative task allocation problem called shortest paths: Let G be a graph in which the edges are owned by self interested agents. The cost of each edge is privatel...
Our proposed methods employ learning and search techniques to estimate outcome features of interest as a function of mechanism parameter settings. We illustrate our approach with ...
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Christopher Kiekintveld, Mic...
In this paper we study the mechanism design problem of coalition formation and cost sharing in an electronic marketplace, where buyers can form coalitions to take advantage of dis...
Consider an open infrastructure in which anyone can deploy mechanisms to support automated decision making and coordination amongst self-interested computational agents. Strategyp...
High-interaction honeypots are interesting as they help understand how attacks unfold on a compromised machine. However, observations are generally limited to the operations perfo...
Eric Alata, Ion Alberdi, Vincent Nicomette, Philip...