We investigate the properties of a multiagent system where each (distributed) agent locally perceives its environment. Upon perception of an unexpected event, each agent locally c...
Gauvain Bourgne, Gael Hette, Nicolas Maudet, Suzan...
Bidding for multiple items or bundles on online auctions raises challenging problems. We assume that an agent has a valuation function that returns its valuation for an arbitrary ...
In large, collaborative, heterogeneous teams, team members often collect information that is useful to other members of the team. Recognizing the utility of such information and d...
Prasanna Velagapudi, Oleg A. Prokopyev, Katia P. S...
We investigate the design of iterative, limited-precision mechanisms for single-good auctions with dominant strategy equilibria. Our aim is to design mechanisms that minimize the ...
We present and evaluate a method for estimating the relevance and calibrating the values of parameters of an evolutionary algorithm. The method provides an information theoretic m...