Abstract. We study a general class of non-cooperative games coming from combinatorial covering and facility location problems. A game for k players is based on an integer programmi...
We study the impact of collusion in network games with splittable flow and focus on the well established price of anarchy as a measure of this impact. We first investigate symmet...
—We consider routing games where the performance of each user is dictated by the worst (bottleneck) element it employs. We are given a network, finitely many (selfish) users, eac...
: We revisit price of anarchy in network routing, in a new model in which routing decisions are made by self-interested components of the network, as opposed to by the flows as in ...
In a scheduling game, each player owns a job and chooses a machine to execute it. While the social cost is the maximal load over all machines (makespan), the cost (disutility) of ...