In a class of games known as Stackelberg games, one agent (the leader) must commit to a strategy that can be observed by the other agent (the follower or adversary) before the adv...
Praveen Paruchuri, Jonathan P. Pearce, Janusz Mare...
In an era of cooperating ad hoc networks and pervasive wireless connectivity, we are becoming more vulnerable to malicious attacks. Many of these attacks are silent in nature and ...
Our work presents a mechanism designed for the selection of the optimal information provider in a multi-agent, heterogeneous and unsupervised monitoring system. The selfadaptation...
The insider threat against database management systems is a dangerous security problem. Authorized users may abuse legitimate privileges to masquerade as other users or to maliciou...
Sunu Mathew, Michalis Petropoulos, Hung Q. Ngo, Sh...
This paper presents techniques to integrate and reason about complementary intrusion evidence such as alerts generated by intrusion detection systems (IDSs) and reports by system ...
Yan Zhai, Peng Ning, Purush Iyer, Douglas S. Reeve...