Quite a bit is known about minimizing different kinds of regret in experts problems, and how these regret types relate to types of equilibria in the multiagent setting of repeated...
Cut games and party affiliation games are well-known classes of potential games. Schaffer and Yannakakis showed that computing pure Nash equilibrium in these games is PLScomplete....
We propose a simple and intuitive cost mechanism which assigns costs for the competitive usage of m resources by n selfish agents. Each agent has an individual demand; demands are...
Marios Mavronicolas, Panagiota N. Panagopoulou, Pa...
Finding an equilibrium of an extensive form game of imperfect information is a fundamental problem in computational game theory, but current techniques do not scale to large games...
We consider computational aspects of alternating move games, repeated games in which players take actions at alternating time steps rather than playing simultaneously. We show tha...
Aaron Roth, Maria-Florina Balcan, Adam Kalai, Yish...