149 search results - page 1 / 30 » On Mechanism Design without Payments for Throughput Maximiza... |
91
Voted
INFOCOM
2009
IEEE
15 years 7 months ago
2009
IEEE
—It is well-known that the overall efficiency of a distributed system can suffer if the participating entities seek to maximize their individual performance. Consequently, mecha...
99
Voted
WINE
2009
Springer
15 years 7 months ago
2009
Springer
We study the problem of allocating a single item repeatedly among multiple competing agents, in an environment where monetary transfers are not possible. We design (Bayes-Nash) inc...
107
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ATAL
2010
Springer
15 years 1 months ago
2010
Springer
We investigate the problem of allocating items (private goods) among competing agents in a setting that is both prior-free and paymentfree. Specifically, we focus on allocating mu...
80
Voted
ATAL
2004
Springer
15 years 5 months ago
2004
Springer
119
Voted
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
15 years 6 months ago
2009
ACM
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot b...