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» On No-Regret Learning, Fictitious Play, and Nash Equilibrium
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NIPS
2001
14 years 11 months ago
Playing is believing: The role of beliefs in multi-agent learning
We propose a new classification for multi-agent learning algorithms, with each league of players characterized by both their possible strategies and possible beliefs. Using this c...
Yu-Han Chang, Leslie Pack Kaelbling
SAGT
2010
Springer
175views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2010»
14 years 8 months ago
On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria
Can learning algorithms find a Nash equilibrium? This is a natural question for several reasons. Learning algorithms resemble the behavior of players in many naturally arising gam...
Constantinos Daskalakis, Rafael Frongillo, Christo...
ICML
2003
IEEE
15 years 11 months ago
Learning To Cooperate in a Social Dilemma: A Satisficing Approach to Bargaining
Learning in many multi-agent settings is inherently repeated play. This calls into question the naive application of single play Nash equilibria in multi-agent learning and sugges...
Jeff L. Stimpson, Michael A. Goodrich
NIPS
2003
14 years 11 months ago
Learning Near-Pareto-Optimal Conventions in Polynomial Time
We study how to learn to play a Pareto-optimal strict Nash equilibrium when there exist multiple equilibria and agents may have different preferences among the equilibria. We focu...
Xiao Feng Wang, Tuomas Sandholm
ICML
2003
IEEE
15 years 11 months ago
AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Oppon
A satisfactory multiagent learning algorithm should, at a minimum, learn to play optimally against stationary opponents and converge to a Nash equilibrium in self-play. The algori...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm