Most theoretical definitions about the complexity of manipulating elections focus on the decision problem of recognizing which instances can be successfully manipulated, rather t...
Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Curtis M...
We study the manipulation of voting schemes, where a voter lies about their preferences in the hope of improving the election’s outcome. All voting schemes are potentially manip...
Encouraging voters to truthfully reveal their preferences in an election has long been an important issue. Previous studies have shown that some voting protocols are hard to manip...
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal r...
We resolve an open problem regarding the complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation, namely, the complexity of Copeland -manipulation for {0, 1}. Copeland , 0 1, is an...
Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Henning Sch...