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» On The Complexity of Manipulating Elections
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ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
Complexity of terminating preference elicitation
Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating togethe...
Toby Walsh
CLIMA
2010
13 years 6 months ago
Is Computational Complexity a Barrier to Manipulation?
When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballo...
Toby Walsh
CORR
2006
Springer
154views Education» more  CORR 2006»
13 years 6 months ago
How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?
We study the complexity of influencing elections through bribery: How computationally complex is it for an external actor to determine whether by paying certain voters to change t...
Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hem...
AAAI
2007
13 years 8 months ago
Uncertainty in Preference Elicitation and Aggregation
Uncertainty arises in preference aggregation in several ways. There may, for example, be uncertainty in the votes or the voting rule. Such uncertainty can introduce computational ...
Toby Walsh
CORR
2012
Springer
249views Education» more  CORR 2012»
12 years 2 months ago
Controlling Candidate-Sequential Elections
All previous work on “candidate-control” manipulation of elections has been in the model of full-information, simultaneous voting. This is a problem, since in quite a few real...
Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jör...