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» On the Price of Truthfulness in Path Auctions
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STACS
2004
Springer
15 years 2 months ago
A Lower Bound on the Competitive Ratio of Truthful Auctions
We study a class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for a set of identical items. We adopt the worst case competitive framework defined by [1,2] that compares the profit of an ...
Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Kar...
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
106views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
15 years 2 months ago
Envy-free auctions for digital goods
We study auctions for a commodity in unlimited supply, e.g., a digital good. In particular we consider three desirable properties for auctions: • Competitive: the auction achiev...
Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline
LATIN
2010
Springer
15 years 2 months ago
The Power of Fair Pricing Mechanisms
We explore the revenue capabilities of truthful, monotone (“fair”) allocation and pricing functions for resource-constrained auction mechanisms within a general framework that ...
Christine Chung, Katrina Ligett, Kirk Pruhs, Aaron...
CORR
2006
Springer
160views Education» more  CORR 2006»
14 years 9 months ago
Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover
In set-system auctions, there are several overlapping teams of agents, and a task that can be completed by any of these teams. The auctioneer's goal is to hire a team and pay...
Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldber...
INFOCOM
2009
IEEE
15 years 4 months ago
TRUST: A General Framework for Truthful Double Spectrum Auctions
— We design truthful double spectrum auctions where multiple parties can trade spectrum based on their individual needs. Open, market-based spectrum trading motivates existing sp...
Xia Zhou, Haitao Zheng