41 search results - page 4 / 9 » On the Price of Truthfulness in Path Auctions |
WINE
2007
Springer
15 years 3 months ago
2007
Springer
We consider the problem of designing auctions with worst case revenue guarantees for sponsored search. This problem differs from previous work because of ad dependent clickthroug...
FOCS
2005
IEEE
15 years 3 months ago
2005
IEEE
We study truthful mechanisms for auctions in which the auctioneer is trying to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task, and paying them for their work. As common in the ï¬...
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Voted
CORR
2008
Springer
14 years 9 months ago
2008
Springer
We consider the Offline Ad Slot Scheduling problem, where advertisers must be scheduled to sponsored search slots during a given period of time. Advertisers specify a budget constr...
GLOBECOM
2009
IEEE
15 years 4 months ago
2009
IEEE
IAT
2006
IEEE
15 years 3 months ago
2006
IEEE
Game theory is popular in agent systems for designing auctions with desirable properties. However, many of these properties will only hold if the game and its properties are commo...