68 search results - page 1 / 14 » Optimal Auctions for Spiteful Bidders |
84
Voted
AAAI
2012
13 years 1 months ago
2012
Designing revenue-optimal auctions for various settings is perhaps the most important, yet sometimes most elusive, problem in mechanism design. Spiteful bidders have been intensel...
77
Voted
EUMAS
2006
15 years 13 days ago
2006
We derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidder who participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first consider a model where...
87
Voted
IJCAI
2007
15 years 14 days ago
2007
We study the bidding behavior of spiteful agents who, contrary to the common assumption of selfinterest, maximize a convex combination of their own proļ¬t and their competitorsā...
69
Voted
AAAI
2010
15 years 15 days ago
2010
In many auctions, agents bid more aggressively than selfinterest would prescribe. This can be explained by spite, where the agent's utility not only increases in the agent�...
72
Voted
DAGSTUHL
2006
15 years 13 days ago
2006
In this paper, we derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidder who participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first conside...