68 search results - page 10 / 14 » Optimal Auctions for Spiteful Bidders |
FOCS
2005
IEEE
15 years 3 months ago
2005
IEEE
We use techniques from sample-complexity in machine learning to reduce problems of incentive-compatible mechanism design to standard algorithmic questions, for a wide variety of r...
ALGORITHMICA
2010
14 years 9 months ago
2010
We investigate the algorithmic performance of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in the single item case. We provide a formal definition of a Vickrey algorithm for this framework, a...
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INFOCOM
2011
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
2011
IEEE
—Dynamic spectrum allocation has proven promising for mitigating the spectrum scarcity problem. In this model, primary users lease chunks of under-utilized spectrum to secondary ...
IJCAI
2001
14 years 11 months ago
2001
Combinatorial auctions where bidders can bid on bundles of items can lead to more economical allocations, but determining the winners is NP-complete and inapproximable. We present...
AAAI
2000
14 years 11 months ago
2000
We present a novel algorithm for computing the optimal winning bids in a combinatorial auction (CA), that is, an auction in which bidders bid for bundles of goods. All previously ...