68 search results - page 5 / 14 » Optimal Auctions for Spiteful Bidders |
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
15 years 4 months ago
2009
ACM
The monopolist’s theory of optimal single-item auctions for agents with independent private values can be summarized by two statements. The first is from Myerson [8]: the optim...
SIGECOM
2000
ACM
15 years 2 months ago
2000
ACM
This paper studies auctions in a setting where the di erent bidders arrive at di erent times and the auction mechanism is required to make decisions about each bid as it is receiv...
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
15 years 2 months ago
2003
ACM
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders...
ATAL
2003
Springer
15 years 2 months ago
2003
Springer
Auctions are an important means for purchasing material in the era of e-commerce. Research on auctions often studies them in isolation. In practice, however, auction agents are pa...
STACS
2004
Springer
15 years 3 months ago
2004
Springer
We study a class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for a set of identical items. We adopt the worst case competitive framework defined by [1,2] that compares the profit of an ...