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» Optimal Auctions for Spiteful Bidders
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ATAL
2003
Springer
15 years 2 months ago
Miscomputing ratio: social cost of selfish computing
Auctions are useful mechanism for allocating items (goods, tasks, resources, etc.) in multiagent systems. The bulk of auction theory assumes that the bidders’ valuations for ite...
Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm
WINE
2009
Springer
194views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
15 years 4 months ago
Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders
A well-known result due to Vickery gives a mechanism for selling a number of goods to interested buyers in a way that achieves the maximum social welfare. In practice, a problem wi...
Ravi Kumar, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Sayedi
SODA
2010
ACM
201views Algorithms» more  SODA 2010»
15 years 7 months ago
Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budg...
Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munag...
MAGS
2010
153views more  MAGS 2010»
14 years 4 months ago
Designing bidding strategies in sequential auctions for risk averse agents
Designing efficient bidding strategies for sequential auctions remains an important, open problem area in agent-mediated electronic markets. In existing literature, a variety of bi...
Valentin Robu, Han La Poutré
WINE
2005
Springer
147views Economy» more  WINE 2005»
15 years 3 months ago
Optimal Starting Price in Online Auctions
Reserve price auctions are one of hot research topics in the traditional auction theory. Here we study the starting price in an online auction, counterpart of the public reserve pr...
Hai Yu, Shouyang Wang, Chuangyin Dang