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» Optimal Auctions for Spiteful Bidders
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INFOCOM
2011
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
To preempt or not: Tackling bid and time-based cheating in online spectrum auctions
—Online spectrum auctions offer ample flexibility for bidders to request and obtain spectrum on-the-fly. Such flexibility, however, opens up new vulnerabilities to bidder mani...
Lara B. Deek, Xia Zhou, Kevin C. Almeroth, Haitao ...
CORR
2010
Springer
90views Education» more  CORR 2010»
14 years 9 months ago
Multi-Unit Auctions: Beyond Roberts
We exhibit incentive compatible multi-unit auctions that are not affine maximizers (i.e. are not of the VCG family) and yet approximate the social welfare to within a factor of 1 ...
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan
AI
2002
Springer
14 years 9 months ago
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions, that is, auctions where bidders can bid on combinations of items, tend to lead to more efficient allocations than traditional auction mechanisms in multi-i...
Tuomas Sandholm
GLOBECOM
2009
IEEE
15 years 4 months ago
A Participation Incentive Market Mechanism for Allocating Heterogeneous Network Services
— This paper studies an auction based allocation of network resources for short-term contracts for heterogeneous network services. The combinatorial winner selection yields the o...
Juong-Sik Lee, Boleslaw K. Szymanski
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
219views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2010»
15 years 2 months ago
Revenue maximization with a single sample
We design and analyze approximately revenue-maximizing auctions in general single-parameter settings. Bidders have publicly observable attributes, and we assume that the valuation...
Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Tim Roughgarden, Qiqi Yan