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78
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FOCS
2005
IEEE
15 years 6 months ago
Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms
We study truthful mechanisms for auctions in which the auctioneer is trying to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task, and paying them for their work. As common in the ļ¬...
Anna R. Karlin, David Kempe, Tami Tamir
90
Voted
AAAI
2007
15 years 3 months ago
Partial Revelation Automated Mechanism Design
In most mechanism design settings, optimal general-purpose mechanisms are not known. Thus the automated design of mechanisms tailored to specific instances of a decision scenario...
Nathanael Hyafil, Craig Boutilier
APPROX
2009
Springer
142views Algorithms» more  APPROX 2009»
15 years 7 months ago
Truthful Mechanisms via Greedy Iterative Packing
An important research thread in algorithmic game theory studies the design of efficient truthful mechanisms that approximate the optimal social welfare. A fundamental question is ...
Chandra Chekuri, Iftah Gamzu
97
Voted
SIGECOM
2006
ACM
107views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2006»
15 years 6 months ago
Empirical mechanism design: methods, with application to a supply-chain scenario
Our proposed methods employ learning and search techniques to estimate outcome features of interest as a function of mechanism parameter settings. We illustrate our approach with ...
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Christopher Kiekintveld, Mic...
102
Voted
UAI
2004
15 years 2 months ago
Regret Minimizing Equilibria and Mechanisms for Games with Strict Type Uncertainty
Mechanism design has found considerable application to the construction of agent-interaction protocols. In the standard setting, the type (e.g., utility function) of an agent is n...
Nathanael Hyafil, Craig Boutilier