An important aspect of mechanism design in social choice protocols and multiagent systems is to discourage insincere and manipulative behaviour. We examine the computational compl...
This paper analyzes bilateral multi-issue negotiation between selfinterested agents. Specifically, we consider the case where issues are divisible, there are time constraints in ...
S. Shaheen Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R....
In a scheduling game, each player owns a job and chooses a machine to execute it. While the social cost is the maximal load over all machines (makespan), the cost (disutility) of ...
We argue that while work to optimize the accessibility of the World Wide Web through the publication and dissemination of a range of guidelines is of great importance, there is al...
David Sloan, Andy Heath, Fraser Hamilton, Brian Ke...
In the strategyproof classification setting, a set of labeled examples is partitioned among multiple agents. Given the reported labels, an optimal classification mechanism returns...
Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosens...