Combinatorial auctions where bidders can bid on bundles of items can lead to more economical allocations, but determining the winners is NP-complete and inapproximable. We present...
Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, Davi...
Iterative auctions have many computational advantages over sealed-bid auctions, but can present new possibilities for strategic manipulation. We propose a two-stage technique to m...
This paper is devoted to sequential decision making with Rank Dependent expected Utility (RDU). This decision criterion generalizes Expected Utility and enables to model a wider r...
Bidders on eBay have no dominant bidding strategy when faced with multiple auctions each offering an item of interest. As seen through an analysis of 1,956 auctions on eBay for a...
This paper reports on the development of a comprehensive framework for the analysis and formulation of bids in competitive electricity markets. Competing entities submit offers of...