Sciweavers

11 search results - page 1 / 3
» Optimizing Payments in Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms for Mult...
Sort
View
73
Voted
AAAI
2012
13 years 1 months ago
Optimizing Payments in Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms for Multi-Parameter Domains
In AI research, mechanism design is typically used to allocate tasks and resources to agents holding private information about their values for possible allocations. In this conte...
Lachlan Thomas Dufton, Victor Naroditskiy, Maria P...
91
Voted
AAAI
2006
15 years 9 days ago
Handling Self-Interest in Groups, with Minimal Cost
In group decision-making problems that involve selfinterested agents with private information, reaching socially optimal outcomes requires aligning the goals of individuals with t...
Ruggiero Cavallo
SODA
2004
ACM
128views Algorithms» more  SODA 2004»
15 years 8 days ago
Frugality in path auctions
We consider the problem of picking (buying) an inexpensive s-t path in a graph where edges are owned by independent (selfish) agents, and the cost of an edge is known to its owner...
Edith Elkind, Amit Sahai, Kenneth Steiglitz
154
Voted

Publication
341views
16 years 10 months ago
Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Decentralized Supply Chain Formation
In this thesis, we describe a decentralized supply chain formation problem where the supply chain planner or a central design authority (CDA) is faced with the decision of choosi...
Nikesh Kumar Srivastava
103
Voted
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
216views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
15 years 5 months ago
Approximate mechanism design without money
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot b...
Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz