We study auction-like algorithms for the distributed allocation of tasks to cooperating agents. To reduce the team cost of sequential single-item auction algorithms, we generalize...
Sven Koenig, Craig A. Tovey, Xiaoming Zheng, Ilgaz...
This paper presents a method for designing bundles in a combinatorial auction protocol that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of El...
Computing the Dodgson Score of a candidate in an election is a hard computational problem, which has been analyzed using classical and parameterized analysis. In this paper we reso...
Michael R. Fellows, Bart M. P. Jansen, Daniel Loks...
Despite the large amounts of runtime needed to adequately solve a combinatorial auction (CA), existing iterative CA auction protocols require winner determination during every rou...
Ryan Kastner, Christina Hsieh, Miodrag Potkonjak, ...
Combinatorial auctions where bidders can bid on bundles of items can lead to more economical allocations, but determining the winners is NP-complete and inapproximable. We present...
Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, Davi...