We consider weighted linear congestion games, and investigate how social ignorance, namely lack of information about the presence of some players, affects the inefficiency of pure...
Dimitris Fotakis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexis C. Kap...
We prove the existence of -Nash equilibrium strategies with support logarithmic in the number of pure strategies. We also show that the payoffs to all players in any (exact) Nash...
Richard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, Aranyak Meh...
In large extensive form games with imperfect information, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is a popular, iterative algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria. Whi...
Richard G. Gibson, Marc Lanctot, Neil Burch, Duane...
We introduce a new class of games, asynchronous congestion games (ACGs). In an ACG, each player has a task that can be carried out by any element of a set of resources, and each r...
: We introduce a graph-theoretic generalization of classical Arrow-Debreu economics, in which an undirected graph specifies which consumers or economies are permitted to engage in...