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AMMA
2009
Springer
14 years 25 days ago
Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization
ABSTRACT: We examine an environment where goods and privately informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. A seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with...
Maher Said
ECAI
2008
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
A Truthful Two-Stage Mechanism for Eliciting Probabilistic Estimates with Unknown Costs
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that motivates selfish rational agents to make a costly probabilistic estim...
Athanasios Papakonstantinou, Alex Rogers, Enrico H...
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal
We study a more powerful variant of false-name manipulation in Internet auctions: an agent can submit multiple false-name bids, but then, once the allocation and payments have bee...
Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
Efficient agents for cliff-edge environments with a large set of decision options
This paper proposes an efficient agent for competing in Cliff Edge (CE) environments, such as sealed-bid auctions, dynamic pricing and the ultimatum game. The agent competes in on...
Ron Katz, Sarit Kraus
MAM
2007
157views more  MAM 2007»
13 years 6 months ago
Executing large algorithms on low-capacity FPGAs using flowpath partitioning and runtime reconfiguration
This paper describes a new method of executing a software program on an FPGA for embedded systems. Rather than combine reconfigurable logic with a microprocessor core, this method...
Darrin M. Hanna, Michael DuChene