We describe CSAR, a novel technique for generating cryptographically strong, accountable randomness. Using CSAR, we can generate a pseudo-random sequence and a proof that the elem...
Michael Backes, Peter Druschel, Andreas Haeberlen,...
Abstract. We introduce VSH, very smooth hash, a new S-bit hash function that is provably collision-resistant assuming the hardness of finding nontrivial modular square roots of ver...
Finding flaws in security protocol implementations is hard. Finding flaws in the implementations of sensor network security protocols is even harder because they are designed to p...
Verifying security properties of protocols requires developers to manually create protocol-specific intruder models, which could be tedious and error prone. We present Slede, a ve...
We present an implementation of the protocol of Lindell and Pinkas for secure two-party computation which is secure against malicious adversaries [13]. This is the first running sy...