We develop a general method for proving properties of contract-signing protocols using a specialized protocol logic. The method is applied to the Asokan-ShoupWaidner and the Garay...
Michael Backes, Anupam Datta, Ante Derek, John C. ...
Strand space analysis [13, 12] is a method for stating and proving correctness properties for cryptographic protocols. In this paper we apply the same method to the related proble...
F. Javier Thayer, Jonathan C. Herzog, Joshua D. Gu...
—Formal methods have proved their usefulness for analysing the security of protocols. In this setting, privacy-type security properties (e.g. vote-privacy, anonymity, unlinkabili...
In this paper we propose a new voting protocol with desirable security properties. The voting stage of the protocol can be performed by humans without computers; it provides every...
Abstract. We describe a cryptographically sound formal logic for proving protocol security properties without explicitly reasoning about probability, asymptotic complexity, or the ...
Anupam Datta, Ante Derek, John C. Mitchell, Vitaly...