In this paper we define a sequent calculus to formally specify, simulate, debug and verify security protocols. In our sequents we distinguish between the current knowledge of prin...
One of the important challenges when designing and analyzing cryptographic protocols is the enforcement of security properties in the presence of compromised participants. This pa...
Michael Backes, Martin P. Grochulla, Catalin Hritc...
Model checkers such as FDR have been extremely e ective in checking for, and nding, attacks on cryptographic protocols { see, for example 11, 12, 14] and many of the papers in 3]....
Security protocols are small programs designed to ensure properties such as secrecy of messages or authentication of parties in a hostile environment. In this paper we investigate ...
In this paper we show a novel method for modelling behaviours of security protocols using networks of communicating automata in order to verify them with SAT-based bounded model ch...