When exploring a game over a large strategy space, it may not be feasible or cost-effective to evaluate the payoff of every relevant strategy profile. For example, determining a p...
Patrick R. Jordan, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Michael P...
Inhabiting the complex and dynamic environments of modern computer games with autonomous agents capable of intelligent timely behaviour is a significant research challenge. We illu...
In addressing the challenge of exponential scaling with the number of agents we adopt a cluster-based representation to approximately solve asymmetric games of very many players. ...
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic resul...
Table 1 shows the payoff to player one. The same matrix also holds for player two. Player one can gain the maximum 5 points (T = 5) by defection if player two cooperates. However,...