Sciweavers

262 search results - page 2 / 53
» Robust mechanisms for information elicitation
Sort
View
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
143views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
15 years 2 months ago
Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efï¬cient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the biddersâ...
Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm
WEBI
2004
Springer
15 years 2 months ago
Eliciting Truthful Feedback for Binary Reputation Mechanisms
Reputation mechanisms offer an efï¬cient way of building the necessary level of trust in electronic markets. Feedback about an agent’s past behavior can be aggregated into a me...
Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings
IJISEC
2007
119views more  IJISEC 2007»
14 years 9 months ago
An incentive compatible reputation mechanism for ubiquitous computing environments
The vision of ubiquitous computing is becoming a reality thanks to the advent of portable devices and the advances in wireless networking technologies. It aims to facilitate user ...
Jinshan Liu, Valérie Issarny
AMAI
2005
Springer
14 years 9 months ago
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
We consider auction design in a setting with costly preference elicitation. Well designed auctions can help to avoid unnecessary elicitation while determining efficient allocations...
David C. Parkes
GRID
2007
Springer
15 years 3 months ago
Eliciting honest value information in a batch-queue environment
Abstract— Markets and auctions have been proposed as mechanisms for efï¬ciently and fairly allocating resources in a number of different computational settings. Economic approac...
Andrew Mutz, Richard Wolski, John Brevik