We propose a coin-flip protocol which yields a string of strong, random coins and is fully simulatable against poly-sized quantum adversaries on both sides. It can be implemented ...
Can we secure user authentication against eavesdropping adversaries, relying on human cognitive functions alone, unassisted by any external computational device? To accomplish thi...
Imagine many small devices send data to a single receiver, encrypted using the receiver’s public key. Assume an adversary that has the power to adaptively corrupt a subset of the...
Serge Fehr, Dennis Hofheinz, Eike Kiltz, Hoeteck W...
System-call monitoring has become the basis for many hostbased intrusion detection as well as policy enforcement techniques. Mimicry attacks attempt to evade system-call monitorin...
Abstract. We present a general method to prove security properties of cryptographic protocols against active adversaries, when the messages exchanged by the honest parties are arbi...