We consider an architecture for a serverless distributed file system that does not assume mutual trust among the client computers. The system provides security, availability, and ...
William J. Bolosky, John R. Douceur, David Ely, Ma...
Abstract. We consider two standard notions in formal security protocol analysis: message deducibility and static equivalence under equational theories. We present polynomial-time a...
Encrypt-and-sign, where one encrypts and signs a message in parallel, is usually not recommended for confidential message transmission. The reason is that the signature typically l...
Alexander W. Dent, Marc Fischlin, Mark Manulis, Ma...
In this paper, we study the question of whether or not it is possible to construct protocols for general secure computation in the setting of malicious adversaries and no honest m...
We formalize the notion of a cryptographic counter, which allows a group of participants to increment and decrement a cryptographic representation of a (hidden) numerical value pri...