We present complexity results for the verification of security protocols. Since the perfect cryptography assumption is unrealistic for cryptographic primitives with visible algebr...
Abstract. In this paper, we introduce a framework composed of a syntax and its compositional Petri net semantics, for the specification and verification of properties (like authent...
Roland Bouroulet, Raymond R. Devillers, Hanna Klau...
Abstract. Untraceability and unreuseability are essential security properties for electronic cash protocols. Many protocols have been proposed to meet these two properties. However...
Although modern communications services are susceptible to third-party eavesdropping via a wide range of possible techniques, law enforcement agencies in the US and other countrie...
Micah Sherr, Gaurav Shah, Eric Cronin, Sandy Clark...
We describe a technique for verifying that a hardware design correctly implements a protocol-level formal specification. Simulation steps are translated to protocol state transiti...