Verifying security properties of protocols requires developers to manually create protocol-specific intruder models, which could be tedious and error prone. We present Slede, a ve...
Security properties such as con dentiality and authenticity may be considered in terms of the ow of messages within a network. To the extent that this characterisation is justi ed...
We formalize aspects of the Kerberos 5 authentication protocol in the Multi-Set Rewriting formalism (MSR) on two levels of detail. The more detailed formalization reflects the in...
Frederick Butler, Iliano Cervesato, Aaron D. Jagga...
Automatic security protocol analysis is currently feasible only for small protocols. Since larger protocols quite often are composed of many small protocols, compositional analysi...
Suzana Andova, Cas J. F. Cremers, Kristian Gj&osla...
The application of formal methods to security protocol analysis has been extensively researched during the last 25 years. Several formalisms and (semi-)automatic tools for the ver...