Sciweavers

116 search results - page 5 / 24
» Selling Privacy at Auction
Sort
View
104
Voted
ATAL
2006
Springer
15 years 7 days ago
Evaluating bidding strategies for simultaneous auctions
Bidding for multiple items or bundles on online auctions raises challenging problems. We assume that an agent has a valuation function that returns its valuation for an arbitrary ...
Teddy Candale, Sandip Sen
84
Voted
ECRA
2007
116views more  ECRA 2007»
14 years 10 months ago
Two-level workload characterization of online auctions
Online auctions are rapidly becoming one of the significant forms of electronic commerce for buying and selling goods and services. A good understanding of the workload of auctio...
Vasudeva Akula, Daniel A. Menascé
ATAL
2007
Springer
15 years 4 months ago
Online auctions for bidders with interdependent values
Interdependent values (IDV) is a valuation model allowing bidders in an auction to express their value for the item(s) to sell as a function of the other bidders’ information. W...
Florin Constantin, Takayuki Ito, David C. Parkes
91
Voted
ICIS
2000
14 years 11 months ago
Economic mechanism design for securing online auctions
Enhancing e-commerce security through computing technology alone is not sufficient. E-commerce designers should apply economic mechanisms to design proper digital processes that a...
Wenli Wang, Zoltán Hidvégi, Andrew B...
64
Voted
FOCS
2007
IEEE
15 years 4 months ago
Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy
We study the role that privacy-preserving algorithms, which prevent the leakage of specific information about participants, can play in the design of mechanisms for strategic age...
Frank McSherry, Kunal Talwar