We study auctions in which bidders have severe constraints on the size of messages they are allowed to send to the auctioneer. In such auctions, each bidder has a set of k possible...
We investigate asymptotically optimal keyword auctions, that is, auctions which maximize revenue as the number of bidders grows. We do so under two alternative behavioral assumpti...
We investigate the design of iterative, limited-precision mechanisms for single-good auctions with dominant strategy equilibria. Our aim is to design mechanisms that minimize the ...
Sequential single-item auctions can be used for the distributed allocation of tasks to cooperating agents. We study how to improve the team performance of sequential singleitem au...
Sven Koenig, Xiaoming Zheng, Craig A. Tovey, Richa...
We derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidding agent that participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first consider a mo...
Enrico H. Gerding, Rajdeep K. Dash, David C. K. Yu...