We investigate asymptotically optimal keyword auctions, that is, auctions which maximize revenue as the number of bidders grows. We do so under two alternative behavioral assumpti...
In this paper, we derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidder who participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first conside...
Enrico H. Gerding, Rajdeep K. Dash, David C. K. Yu...
– In this paper, we propose an auction mechanism for routing in mobile ad hoc networks with selfish nodes. Our approach is to promote bidding for end-to-end routes, as opposed to...
Sequential and simultaneous auctions are two important mechanisms for buying/selling multiple objects. These two mechanisms yield different outcomes (i.e., different revenues and a...
We introduce a study of position auctions, with an explicit modeling of user navigation through ads. We refer to our model as the PPA model, since it is most applicable in the con...