This paper concerns the design of mechanisms for online scheduling in which agents bid for access to a re-usable resource such as processor time or wireless network access. Each a...
Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mo...
Bids submitted in auctions are usually treated as enforceable commitments in most bidding and auction theory literature. In reality bidders often withdraw winning bids before the ...
The family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They...
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a key issue in multiagent systems. Due to its universality, voting has a central role among preference aggregation mechanisms. Votin...
Motivated by the need for an informative, unbiased and quantitative perceptual method for the development and evaluation of a talking head we are developing, we propose a new test...
Darren Cosker, Susan Paddock, A. David Marshall, P...