3 search results - page 1 / 1 » Strategic deliberation and truthful revelation: an impossibi... |
79
Voted
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
15 years 2 months ago
2004
ACM
In many market settings, agents do not know their preferences a priori. Instead, they may have to solve computationally complex optimization problems, query databases, or perform ...
101
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SAGT
2009
Springer
15 years 4 months ago
2009
Springer
Abstract. A mechanism is manipulable if it is in some agents’ best interest to misrepresent their private information. The revelation principle establishes that, roughly, anythin...
83
Voted
AMEC
2004
Springer
15 years 2 months ago
2004
Springer
Abstract. In many settings, bidding agents for auctions do not know their preferences a priori. Instead, they must actively determine them through deliberation (e.g., information p...