24 search results - page 3 / 5 » Strong and Pareto Price of Anarchy in Congestion Games |
ICALP
2007
Springer
14 years 12 days ago
2007
Springer
As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for loa...
WINE
2007
Springer
14 years 10 days ago
2007
Springer
Abstract. In this work, we consider singleton congestion games as a special class of (weighted) congestion games where each players' strategy consists only of a single resourc...
WAOA
2005
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2005
Springer
We study computational and coordination efficiency issues of Nash equilibria in symmetric network congestion games. We first propose a simple and natural greedy method that comput...
STOC
2009
ACM
14 years 6 months ago
2009
ACM
The price of anarchy (POA) is a worst-case measure of the inefficiency of selfish behavior, defined as the ratio of the objective function value of a worst Nash equilibrium of a g...
ICALP
2011
Springer
12 years 9 months ago
2011
Springer
Abstract. Congestion games model several interesting applications, including routing and network formation games, and also possess attractive theoretical properties, including the ...