Reputation forms an important part of how we come to trust people in face-to-face interactions, and thus situations involving trust online have come to realize that reputation is ...
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot b...
The monopolist’s theory of optimal single-item auctions for agents with independent private values can be summarized by two statements. The first is from Myerson [8]: the optim...
Research to date has demonstrated the apparent differences how architects, as ‘experts’ and members of the public as ‘non-experts’ perceive and understand visual represent...
This paper analyzes sequential auctions for private value objects using second-price sealed-bid rules. Now, the equilibrium bids for such auctions depend on the information uncerta...
S. Shaheen Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R....