: We revisit price of anarchy in network routing, in a new model in which routing decisions are made by self-interested components of the network, as opposed to by the flows as in ...
We investigate the convergence of the price of anarchy after a limited number of moves in the classical multicast communication game when the underlying communication networks is ...
Abstract. We give an overview of important results for non-atomic congestion games in their traditional form along with self-contained and short proofs and then present new results...
—We consider routing games where the performance of each user is dictated by the worst (bottleneck) element it employs. We are given a network, finitely many (selfish) users, eac...
We consider a multicast game with selfish non-cooperative players. There is a special source node and each player is interested in connecting to the source by making a routing de...
Chandra Chekuri, Julia Chuzhoy, Liane Lewin-Eytan,...