Consider an information network with harmful procedures called attackers (e.g., viruses); each attacker uses a probability distribution to choose a node of the network to damage. O...
Marios Mavronicolas, Vicky G. Papadopoulou, Anna P...
We present a Coq-formalised proof that all non-cooperative, sequential games have a Nash equilibrium point. Our proof methodology follows the style advocated by LCFstyle theorem p...
We analyze the complexity of equilibria problems for a class of strategic zero-sum games, called Angel-Daemon games. Those games were introduced to asses the goodness of a web or g...
abstraction of imperfect information games ANDREW GILPIN and TUOMAS SANDHOLM Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA, USA Finding an equilibrium of an...
—We propose a parallel algorithm for finding Nash equilibria in n-player noncooperative games. The algorithm is based on enumerating the supports of mixed strategies in parallel...