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» The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
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2010
Tsinghua U.
15 years 1 months ago
Robust Perfect Revenue From Perfectly Informed Players
: Maximizing revenue in the presence of perfectly informed players is a well known goal in mechanism design. Yet, all current mechanisms for this goal are vulnerable to equilibrium...
Jing Chen, Avinatan Hassidim, Silvio Micali
AMAI
2006
Springer
14 years 9 months ago
Bargaining over multiple issues in finite horizon alternating-offers protocol
In this paper we study multi issue alternating-offers bargaining in a perfect information finite horizon setting, we determine the pertinent subgame perfect equilibrium, and we pro...
Francesco Di Giunta, Nicola Gatti
CG
2010
Springer
14 years 7 months ago
A Principled Method for Exploiting Opening Books
We used in the past a lot of computational power and human expertise for having a very big dataset of good 9x9 Go games, in order to build an opening book. We improved a lot the al...
Romaric Gaudel, Jean-Baptiste Hoock, Julien Perez,...
ATAL
2010
Springer
14 years 11 months ago
Using counterfactual regret minimization to create competitive multiplayer poker agents
Games are used to evaluate and advance Multiagent and Artificial Intelligence techniques. Most of these games are deterministic with perfect information (e.g. Chess and Checkers)....
Nicholas Abou Risk, Duane Szafron
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
112views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
15 years 4 months ago
Network bargaining: algorithms and structural results
We consider models for bargaining in social networks, in which players are represented by vertices and edges represent bilateral opportunities for deals between pairs of players. ...
Tanmoy Chakraborty, Michael Kearns, Sanjeev Khanna