: Maximizing revenue in the presence of perfectly informed players is a well known goal in mechanism design. Yet, all current mechanisms for this goal are vulnerable to equilibrium...
In this paper we study multi issue alternating-offers bargaining in a perfect information finite horizon setting, we determine the pertinent subgame perfect equilibrium, and we pro...
We used in the past a lot of computational power and human expertise for having a very big dataset of good 9x9 Go games, in order to build an opening book. We improved a lot the al...
Games are used to evaluate and advance Multiagent and Artificial Intelligence techniques. Most of these games are deterministic with perfect information (e.g. Chess and Checkers)....
We consider models for bargaining in social networks, in which players are represented by vertices and edges represent bilateral opportunities for deals between pairs of players. ...
Tanmoy Chakraborty, Michael Kearns, Sanjeev Khanna